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ARGUMENTS
I.

IT WAS TS1/ S DUTY TO SUPPLY HEATED
AND CHILLED AIR TO ALLRED' S STORE,
AND ALLRED HAS SHOWN BY AFFIDAVIT
THAT IT DID NOT.

TSl has attempted to confuse what is really a
straight-forward issue.

TSl' s duty under the lease agreement

was to supply heated and chilled air "to the premises." (R. 250)
The "premises" are defined in the lease agreement as the 850
square feet of Allred's store. (R. 13, H (c))

TSl concedes that

Allred installed the local delivery system to hook into TSl' s
central delivery system. (P. 23, Appellee's Brief) 1

The issue

raised by Allred' s Affidavit was whether TSl had connected the
"bay" where Allred's store was located with the central delivery
system in the mall. (R. 237, 11 7)

If it did not, Allred would

not have gotten heated and chilled air, even if she had
correctly hooked into the central delivery system.
Certainly, it was Allred's duty to "adapt" to the
mall's central delivery system. (P. 25, Appellee' s Brief)
that is not the question before the Court.

But

This Court must

determine if paragraph 7 of Allred' s Affidavit has successfully

*TS1 tries to argue that Allred failed to make this allegation in the court below. (P. 22, Appellee' s Brief) Allred made
the allegation in paragraph 3 of her counterclaim. (R. 71)
However, it was unnecessary for Allred to do so, since TSl later
conceded the point in its reply memorandum. (R. 243, " [I]t is the
Plaintiff s contention that the Defendant did connect her store to
the HVAC system. " )
-1161X10157

controverted a necessary element of TSl' s recovery, that is,
whether TS1 supplied heated and chilled air to Allred' s store.
Allred said that it did not, and TSl is correct in urging the
Court not to weigh the evidence. (P. 23, Appellee' s Brief)
While it may seem "improbable" to TS1, Allred has raised a
genuine issue as to a material fact precluding summary judgment
in TSl' s favor.
TSl is left with the same lame argument it made in the
trial court:

Since it was Allred' s duty to install a local

delivery system, TSl has no obligation for supplying heated or
chilled air to her premises.

Contrary to what TSl seems to

suggest (PP. 24-25), it was not Allred's duty to see that all
the central delivery connections were made.

All she was

required to do was hook on to the central delivery system. It is
for the trial court to decide if Allred properly did that.
II.

ALLRED DID NOT NEED TO FILE AN
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HER
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE TSl' S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION WAS BASED ENTIRELY
ON ARGUMENTS OF LAW.

TSl' s third point reveals a fundamental misapprehension of the common law of Utah and her Rules of Civil
Procedure.

There are two parts to a summary judgment:

first,

no genuine issue as to any material fact; second, moving party
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The only factual allegations made by TSl in

-2161U0157

its second summary judgment motion were that Allred signed the
lease agreement and the lease agreement was an integration. (RR.
360, H 1; 361, H 4)

Neither of these facts were disputed.

All

the rest of the "facts" stated by TSl were characterizations of
provisions in the lease agreement (RR. 361-64) and were
therefore arguments of law. 2
TSl has confused its motion for summary judgment with
what has become known as a "Celotex" motion for summary
judgment, after Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986).

In such a motion, the moving party

challenges the factual assertions made by the non-moving party
in its pleadings.

Then, if the non-moving party carries the

burden of proving those factual assertions at trial, it must
respond with evidence of its own.
But TSl did not challenge the factual assertions in
Allred' s counterclaim.

(RR. 360-64).

In fact, its argument was

premised on the truth of those allegations.

It merely

questioned whether as a legal matter Allred had plead facts
sufficient to support a cause of action.

Thus, it was not

incumbent on Allred to put forward evidence of her own, but
rather to argue the legal issues raised by TSl' s motion.

2

It goes without saying that contract interpretation raises
questions of law. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 200 (Utah
1991).
-3161X10157

TS1 questions the sufficiency of Allred' s allegations
of "fraud in the inducement."

Unfortunately for TS1, it did not

|raise this question in the court below (RR. 365-71), so this
I issue is not properly before the Court. 3
TS1 cites only one Utah case in support of its
'proposition that "parol evidence is not. .. admissible to prove
1

fraud. "

F. M. A. Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617

I P. 2d 327 (Utah 1980) does not stand for this proposition.
jfact, it does not even mention "fraud."

In

It does say that the

parol evidence rule

I
1
I
1

should not be applied with any such
unreasoning rigidity as to defeat what may
be shown to be the actual purpose and intent
of the parties, but should be applied in the
light of reason to serve the ends of
justice.

617 P. 2d at 329.
As for the other two claims in Allred' s counterclaim,
TS1 has said nothing about the implied covenant of good faith

Even it had, it is clear that only one of the required
; elements is not plead:
knowledge of the falsity of the reprejsentations. TS1 is wrong when it says there is no allegation of
I reliance. (R. 71, 11 3) There is no requirement that Allred say
jher reliance was "reasonable;" she alleged that she changed her
position to her financial detriment and that is more than suffi| cient. See Mountain Fir Lumber Co. . Inc. v. Employee Benefits Ins.
ICo. , 679 P. 2d 296, 300 (Or. 1984).
TS1 better do its homework
!when it says the claim is deficient for not stating "presently
(existing facts." (P. 31, Appellee's Brief) The Utah Supreme Court
jin Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985) laid this one to
jrest and questioned the good faith of counsel who made the
(argument. 705 P. 2d at 770 & n. 2.

I
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and fair dealing (Allred' s Second Claim for Relief) and has not
attempted to challenge the express provisions in the lease
agreement upon which Allred relies for support (Allred' s Third
Claim for Relief).
III. ALLRED' S JURY TRIAL DEMAND IS NOT
MOOT. AND THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR
THE TRIAL COURT' S RULING THAT SHE
MADE A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
WAIVER.
The issue is not moot because if the trial court
erred, this case will be remanded and there may be need for a
trial.
The best that can be said about the fourth point in
1

TSl's argument is that there is a question as to who carries the

!burden of proof in this matter.
1

There is no Utah authority on

the subject, and the authorities cited by the parties are

[conflicting. Compare Leasing Service Corporation v. Crane, 804
IF. 2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) with K. M. C. Company. Inc. v.
; Irving Trust Company. 757 F. 2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985).
i

However, the Court need not resolve this issue.

TSl

i

i

iconcedes that no matter who has the burden, the trial court's
i
i

.ruling must be overturned if it has no "reasonable basis in the
!

evidence." (P. 37, Appellee's Brief)

We must consider whether

|the evidence in this regard was, as represented by TSl to be,
" ample. "

-5161X10157

On this issue, the tables are turned.

TSl did not

attempt to controvert any of the factual allegations in Allred' s
Affidavit with an affidavit of its own.

Rather, it rested on

the erroneous legal proposition that knowledge of a jury trial
waiver may be "presumed" by the signing of the contract.

TSl

has now recognized that this was error and attempts to fashion
an evidentiary basis out of Allred's own Affidavit. (PP. 37-38)
Allred may have been in business for four and a half
years; may have been to college; and may have assumed a prior
lease (though TSl does not tell us if it also had a jury trial
waiver).

But there is nothing to controvert the singularly

decisive allegation that she did not know the lease agreement
had a jury trial waiver. (R. 146, 11 6)

If this were truly an

issue for the "trier of fact," as TSl concedes (PP. 36-37), then
the issue should have been "tried" on the merits and not by
affidavit.
In reality, there was no evidentiary basis for the
trial court' s ruling.

The trial court made no findings that

would have supported the ruling.

It is clear the trial court

adopted TSl' s legal proposition and therefore erred as a matter
of law.

-6161X10157

IV.

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT
OBJECTIONS TO ATTORNEYS/ FEES
REQUESTS BE IN THE FORM OF
AFFIDAVIT, AND TS1 DOES NOT DENY
THAT THE CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL
WERE AT ITS INSTANCE.

Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
requires that requests for attorneys' fees be by affidavit.
However, there is nothing in Utah law requiring that objections
to those requests likewise be by affidavit.

Quite to the

contrary, this Court in LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d
189 (Utah App. 1991) considered the objections of a party even
when those objections were not in affidavit form. 805 P. 2d at
198 (motion to strike).
TS1 does not deny that the certification of its
judgment and the appeal therefrom were instigated by TS1.

TS1

wanted to execute on its judgment, but could not do so unless it
was "final." Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

TS1 is

the one who sought Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment. (R.
296)

Allred did not believe that Rule 54(b) certification was

appropriate, but was more concerned at the time with execution
on the judgment that TS1 had already started. (R. 276)

When

certification was made,4 Allred had no choice but to appeal.
She fought the efforts of this Court to remit the case for lack

4

Allred did not "consent" to certification.
She merely
signed the certifications as "approved to form," which is not the
same as saying that she agreed or consented to their entry.
-7161X10157.

of appellate jurisdiction because of the investment of time and
money she had made in the appeal.
But none of this answers the question asked by Allred.
Why should she pay all of T S T s attorneys' fees for a certification and appeal that TSl clearly wanted as much as she?

TSl

blithely ignores the fact that it also resisted this Court' s
efforts to remit for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Each party

should pay its own attorneys' fees for this fruitless appeal.
As for the attempted execution on Allred' s supersedeas
bond, TSl would have the Court ignore that it agreed to execute
by motion—with notice to Allred. (R. 322)

TSl tried to do it

without motion and notice (R. 326), and Allred should not have
to pay for TSl' s unlawful efforts in this regard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing additional reasons, Allred asks this
Court to reverse the trial court on its grant of summary
judgment on TSl's complaint and Allred' s counterclaim, with a
direction that there be a trial by jury, if trial is needed.
the alternative, Allred asks the Court to reduce the second
award of attorneys' fees to $3,110.00.
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In

Respectfully submitted this

l<5^

day of March, 1993.
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